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MORALS IN A MARKET BUBBLE
Robert T. Miller*

What role did moral wrongdoing play in causing the financial
crisis? According to one of my co-panelists at the symposium, the primary
cause of the demise of the financial sector was a series of poor ethical
decisions by all involved.1 Indeed, this panelist parcels out moral blame to
regulators, Wall Street financiers, loan originators and securitizers, auditors,
rating agencies, and consumers.2 Economic journalist Jeff Madrick blames
mostly the Wall Street bankers who, because of their “unquenchable thirst
for easy profits,” took “unjustifiable risks for their own gain” that
“jeopardize[d] the future of the nation’s credit system.”3 Going even
further, my good friend Professor Ronald Colombo thinks that “our current
economic woes are, in large part, the repercussions of a national crisis of
character.”4 In his view, a relaxation of traditional values has spawned a
generation of immoral bankers who “put[] profits before people.”5 These
explanations are all very pious-sounding and provide a story that is readily
intelligible to the average person who easily grasps moral arguments but
knows little about finance and nothing about macroeconomics. This story,
however, bears little relation to reality. Below, I shall explain why, first by
sketching a purely economic explanation of the crisis and then by turning to
some of the favorite examples of the moralizers and showing how the
wrongdoing that they perceive in them is largely fantasy.
I. MARKET BUBBLES AND WHERE THEY COME FROM
The cognitive powers of human beings are limited. There is much
we do not know about how the world will develop around us, and so in
*Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I thank Colleen Baker, Richard
A. Booth, Eric R. Claeys, Thomas C. Crimmins, John Y. Gotanda, James Maule, Joan G. Miller, Mark L.
Movsesian, John F. Murphy, Jennifer O’Hare, Richard E. Redding, Amanda M. Rose, Chaim Saiman,
and Mark A. Sargent for helpful comments and discussion about the ideas presented in this Article. I
thank Courtney Magnarella for her excellent work as my research assistant. Most of all, I thank Jennifer
L. Miller, whose assistance and comments on all aspects of this Article were absolutely indispensable to
its completion.
1
Jon S. Hoak, Vice President, Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer, Hewlett-Packard, Business
Ethics and Corporate Responsibility After the 2008 Bailout, Address at the University of Dayton School
of Law Symposium, The Fallout From the Bailout: The Impact of the 2008 Bailout on Lending
Regulation, Securities Regulation, and Business Ethics (Mar. 20, 2009).
2
Id.
3
Jeff Madrick, How We Were Ruined & What We Can Do, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 12, 2009, at
15.
4
Ronald J. Colombo, A Crisis of Character, HUFFINGTON POST, May 12, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-j-colombo/a-crisis-of-character_b_202562.html.
5
Id.
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making market decisions—like whether to buy or sell, borrow or lend, and
at what prices or interest rates—we human beings usually operate under
conditions of great uncertainty. Sometimes, it may seem that something
very important is changing (the kinds of things economists call
“fundamentals”), and that this change will justify paying higher prices for a
certain class of assets. Thus, in the 1990s, amidst the information
technology revolution, when Internet usage was doubling every 100 days,
people thought—reasonably and correctly—that dot-com companies were
going to make quite a lot of money.6 How much money? That would
depend on, among many other things, how long and how fast Internet usage
continued to increase—and that, of course, no one knew for sure, for we
never before had anything like the Internet. Hence, everyone involved in
the market took an educated guess about how much Internet usage would
increase and estimated what would likely be the future earnings of dot-com
companies. As a result of these guesses and estimates, people bid up the
prices of dot-com stocks. As it happened, however, the collective judgment
of the market was too optimistic. Although Internet usage increased greatly,
it did not increase as much as people thought it would. When it became
clear that the growth rate of Internet usage was slowing and thus that the
dot-coms were not going to make as much money as people had thought, it
also became clear that the prices of dot-com stocks were too high. People
then started selling them, and the dot-com stock prices crashed. We had a
bubble, and then it burst.
Bubbles always work like this. They are based on uncertainty about
important changes in fundamentals. Often, as with the dot-com bubble in
the late 1990s, the uncertainty arises from technological change. Similarly,
in the period from 1924 to 1929, the American economy experienced
unprecedented productivity gains as major industries were rationalized and
financial professionals invented new kinds of financial services (like
installment purchases) that opened up new markets. People thought that
these gains would be very big and continue for a long time, and so, aided by
other financial innovations (this time buying stocks on margin), people bid
up stock prices. In fact, the collective judgment of the market, though
reasonable at the time, turned out to be overoptimistic. Once this became
clear, stock prices crashed in 1929. Indeed, financial history brims with
bubbles—from the tulip bubble in Holland in the 1630s and the South Seas
bubble in England in the 1720s, to the conglomerate bubble in the 1960s, the
Nifty-Fifty bubble in the 1970s, and the Japanese real estate bubble in the

6
See generally Yochi J. Dreazen, Wildly Optimistic Data Drove Telecoms to Build Fiber Glut,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2002, at B1 & B8, available at http://www.mail-archive.com/penl@galaxy.csuchico.edu/msg72914.html (referencing a 1998 Commerce Report stating the Internet usage
doubles every 100 hundred days).
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1980s.7 The dot-com bubble in the 1990s was simply the latest bubble in
the American economy—until, that is, the truly tremendous bubble in the
housing market in the early and mid 2000s.
The key principle to understand is that bubbles are no one’s fault.
Bubbles are simply a product of the limits of human cognitive powers. As
long as people can buy and sell based on their expectations about the future
(and based on what else do we buy and sell?), and as long as the human
ability to predict the future is limited, it will sometimes happen that people
are reasonably but mistakenly optimistic for prolonged periods of time.8
When this happens, the price of a class of assets rises too high—and then
crashes when new evidence becomes available and allows people finally to
realize their collective mistake. Until we abolish buying and selling under
conditions of uncertainty or else become omniscient, from time to time there
will be bubbles.
Because bubbles arise when there is a prolonged period of
reasonable error about changing fundamentals, it is impossible for us to
know when we are in a bubble. This perplexes some people, but there is no
mystery here. All we are saying is that, while there remain reasonable
grounds for thinking that a change in fundamentals justifies higher asset
prices, people cannot know for sure that such higher prices are unjustified.
While the bubble—that is, the reasonable error—persists, some people will
(with more or less evidence to support their view) suspect that we are in a
bubble, and some people will be subjectively certain that we are in a bubble
(subjectively certain in the sense that such certainty is compatible with
actually being wrong). These people will bid down or even sell short the
affected assets (thus limiting the size of the bubble and so performing an
important public service)—but this is not the same as knowing that we are in
bubble. We know we are in a bubble only when the reasonable error about
changing fundamentals is dispelled—that is, only when new evidence that
there has been no change in fundamentals accumulates and becomes so
conclusive that almost everyone believes that prices have risen too high. At
this point, almost everyone sells, which means that asset prices crash.
Hence, as soon as we know we are in a bubble, the bubble bursts. In
hindsight, then, we can see that prices rose without a justifying change in
fundamentals and then crashed again when the absence of the justifying
change became apparent. Prices ran up because people reasonably but
7
See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 34-96 (2007) (discussing examples of different types of bubbles
in language accessible to lay readers).
8
What happens when people are buying and selling when they are too pessimistic about the future?
Then, a certain class of assets will be underpriced, but people will generally not realize this until the
change in fundamentals that justifies a higher price becomes apparent to the market. At that point, the
price of the underpriced assets will rise steeply and remain high. Although such events are common
enough, we do not have a word for them, no doubt because while bubbles tend to cause recessions when
they burst, such pleasant surprises about improving fundamentals are just that—pleasant surprises.
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Thus, bubbles are

II. THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND INTEREST RATES
So, how did we get such a huge bubble in the United States housing
market? Answering that question requires that we take a step back and talk
about the Federal Reserve. In ways that most Americans never notice, the
Federal Reserve can control interest rates by controlling the money supply.
How it does this is complex and counterintuitive, and although I cannot go
into all the details here, many accessible accounts are available.9 For our
purposes, it is enough to understand the essentials. In particular, when the
Federal Reserve is concerned that economic activity is slowing and the
economy is going to slip into recession, it lowers interest rates by increasing
the money supply.10 With interest rates lower, it is cheaper to borrow, and
so people borrow more money. Because mostly what people do with
borrowed money is spend it, as when individuals take out a mortgage to buy
a house or businesses borrow to upgrade their equipment, lowering interest
rates stimulates consumption and so elicits additional supply to meet
increased demand.11 If the Federal Reserve increases the money supply too
much, however, and sets interest rates too low for too long, there will be
more and more money chasing basically the same quantity of goods and
services (that is, the money supply increases faster than the economy can
expand output). Thus, prices will begin to rise, causing inflation, which has
serious deleterious effects.12 So, the Federal Reserve plays a delicate game:
when the economy slows down, it lowers interest rates to increase economic
growth and prevent the economy from slipping into recession, but when the
economy speeds up too much and inflation looms, it raises interest rates to
decrease economic growth and head off inflation.
Knowing when to raise or lower rates and by how much is, as you
might expect, very difficult.13 Once again we bump up against the limits of
human cognitive powers. Still, during the twenty-year period from about
1982 to 2002, the Federal Reserve did a remarkably good job of adjusting
interest rates to support steady economic growth without triggering
inflation. Indeed, the stability of growth in gross domestic product during
9

See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
AND FUNCTIONS 15-25 (9th ed. 2005), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.

10
More precisely, the Federal Reserve’s open market operations affect conditions in the market for
balances that depository institutions (i.e., certain banks) hold at the Federal Reserve Banks. See id. at 2750. The text in this section takes a number of liberties and suppresses many complexities in order to
achieve a more intelligible explanation of this somewhat arcane topic.
11
See id. at 16-19 (explaining how changes in monetary policy affect the broader economy).
12
See id. at 18 (discussing conditions under which the Federal Reserve would raise interest rates).
13
See id. at 20 (discussing some of the limitations under which policy makers at the Federal
Reserve necessarily operate, such as limited and imperfect information about economic conditions,
including the lag in macroeconomic data).
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this period has led some economists to refer to these years as the “Great
Moderation” and to give the credit therefor, at least in part, to improved
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve.14 Notably, during this period
interest rates (more accurately, the federal funds rate) as set by the Federal
Reserve followed closely the so-called Taylor Rule, a guide to setting
interest rates named for the macroeconomist who first proposed it, Professor
John Taylor of Stanford University.15
III. THE FEDERAL RESERVE CREATES A BUBBLE IN THE HOUSING MARKET16
Now, after the bust of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Federal Reserve naturally worried that
the economy might slip into recession. Hence, it did exactly the right thing:
it lowered interest rates.17 But then, beginning in late 2001, the Federal
14
The term was coined by James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Has the Business Cycle Changed
and Why? in 17 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2002, 159, 162 (Mark Gertler & Kenneth Rogoff
eds., 2003). Noting that from 1960 to1983 the standard deviation of the annual growth rates in real GDP
in the United States was 2.7% but from 1984 to 2001 it was only 1.6%, Stock and Watson use a variety
of statistical techniques to attempt to explain this large drop in cyclical volatility of real economic
activity and conclude that improved policy (especially improved monetary policy) was a significant
factor in producing the Great Moderation. Id. at 185. The term “The Great Moderation” was further
popularized by a speech of the same name by Ben S. Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve governor. See
Ben S. Bernanke, The Great Moderation, Remarks at the Eastern Economics Association (Feb. 20, 2004),
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/1191/download/64784/bernanke_20040220.pdf.
15
E.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK 3 (2009) (explaining how the federal funds rate
departed from the Taylor Rule from late 2001 to early 2006). But see THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 9, at 23-24 (discussing the Taylor Rule as one among many
guides to setting monetary policy and noting that the Federal Open Market Committee uses many
measures to determine how to set monetary policy, not just the Taylor Rule).
16
At the time of the symposium at which this paper was delivered (March 20, 2009), I believed that
the available evidence supported the proposition that the housing bubble was primarily caused by the
Federal Reserve’s keeping interest rates too low for too long as explained in the text. See, e.g., TAYLOR,
supra note 15, and sources cited therein. Thus, on March 19, 2009, the day before the symposium, even
Alan Greenspan, who naturally never accepted this view, lamented in The Wall Street Journal that “in
mid-2007, history began to be rewritten” so as to blame alleged monetary policy mistakes by the Federal
Reserve for causing the bubble. Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A15 (arguing that the bubble was caused not by monetary policy mistakes by the
Federal Reserve but largely by unprecedented international capital flows into the U.S. housing market).
As of the time this article is going to press in early 2010, however, new evidence is available that makes
the matter less clear than the text allows. See Ben S. Bernanke, Monetary Policy and the Housing
Bubble, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.pdf (arguing that the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy was not responsible for the bubble). But see John B. Taylor, The Fed and the
Crisis: A Reply to Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703481004574646100272016422.html (arguing that Bernanke’s defense of the
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is mistaken). Clearly, more investigation is needed regarding the
causes of the bubble. Although I continue to believe that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy from
2002 to 2005 was too accommodating and was an important cause of the bubble, if I were writing the
text of this piece today, I would express my views more guardedly and allow subprime mortgages a
larger role in causing the bubble (i.e., because the higher housing prices rose, the more people qualified
for subprime mortgages, thus increasing demand in the housing market and so causing housing prices to
rise even higher, thus generating a bubble effect).
17
See Minutes of Conference Call of the Federal Open Market Committee (Sept. 13, 2001),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20010821.htm#Min_20010913
(discussing
economic
effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks). Press Release, Federal Open Market Committee
(Sept. 17, 2001), (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2001/20010917/)
(announcing a 50 basis point reduction in the federal funds rate from 3.50% to 3.0%).
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Reserve departed from the Taylor Rule.18 When the rule would have called
for raising rates, the Federal Reserve left them low—and then lowered them
again. Through most of 2003 and into 2004, the federal funds rate stood at
1%—the lowest it had ever been.19 Indeed, the Bank of England, which
performs in the United Kingdom a function similar to that of the Federal
Reserve in the United States, had never lowered its analogous rate below
2%—never at any time since it was founded in 1694.20 By 2004, the Federal
Reserve did, indeed, start to raise rates, but it did so slowly, such that the
federal funds rate lagged behind what the Taylor Rule would have
prescribed until early in 2006.21
Now, what was the effect of the Federal Reserve’s keeping interest
rates so low for so long? Normally, the result would be inflation, and that
indeed is what the Federal Reserve was on the lookout for,22 but there was
no worrying inflation. From 2002 through 2005, however, housing prices
were increasing rapidly, with prices in some markets increasing almost 20%
per year in some years.23 As we now know, this was a bubble. Having left
interest rates too low for too long, the Federal Reserve had supplied the
credit that people—many people—were using to buy houses.
This is hardly surprising, and it was a perfectly reasonable response
from consumers. When the price of anything falls, people buy more of it,
and so when the price of borrowing money (that is, interest rates) falls,
people borrow more. The supply of housing does not increase quickly even
when prices are rising (as economists would say, the supply of housing is
inelastic), because it takes a considerable period of time to build a new
house and because, at least in many areas, the supply of available land on
which to build is severely limited. Hence, when the demand for housing
shot up because there was so much credit available to buy houses, the
supply of housing did not increase as fast as the demand. Housing prices
thus rose sharply.
But why houses? After all, people can use borrowed money to do
any number of things, and in fact from 2002 through 2006, people did
18
TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 1-14 (discussing the Federal Reserve’s departing from the Taylor Rule
and its effect).
19
Donald L. Kohn, Monetary Policy and Imbalances, Remarks at the Banking and Finance Lecture
Series at Widener University 1 (Apr. 1, 2004), http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/1226/download/
67987/kohn_20040401.pdf.
20
Jon Hilsenrath, Fed’s Path to Higher Interest Rates Begins to Take Shape, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
2009, at A2.
21
See Taylor, supra note 15, at 3.
22
E.g., Press Release, Federal Open Market Committee (June 29, 2006) (available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) (noting that “[r]eadings on
core inflation have been elevated in recent months” and announcing an increase of 25 basis points in the
federal funds rate to 5.25%).
23
See STANDARD & POOR’S, S&P CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES 2008, A YEAR IN REVIEW 2
(2009),
available
at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/Case-Shiller_Housing_
Whitepaper_YearinReview.pdf.
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borrow for numerous purposes. The immense bubble, however, appeared in
the housing market, not the market for biotech stocks or pork bellies or
commercial paper.24 So why houses? There are three main answers. First,
real estate makes excellent collateral (for example, the borrower cannot
abscond with it), and so real estate purchases are funded with debt
disproportionately relative to purchases of other kinds of assets. Hence, if
there is too much money and thus too much credit in the market, real estate
is especially likely to suffer a bubble.
Second, Americans have long believed that everyone should be able
to own his or her own home, and so government at all levels provides
subsidies for homeownership.
Most obvious among these are the
deductibility for federal income tax purposes of the interest on home
mortgage loans (the interest on most other kinds of consumer debt is not
deductible),25 the deductibility of state and local real estate taxes,26 and the
very favorable capital gains treatment available when homes are sold.27
Less obvious but also very important is that American homeowners are not
taxed on the income imputable from homeownership.28 Furthermore, the socalled government sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are in
the business of buying or insuring home mortgages, and to do this they
borrow huge amounts of money. Although their borrowings were not
legally guaranteed by the United States, the market believed (correctly, as it
turned out) that the federal government would step in to guarantee Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac’s obligations if they ever got into trouble.29 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were thus able to borrow very cheaply to buy or
insure home mortgage loans, and this ultimately drove down the interest
rates that homeowners had to pay. Through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
the government of the United States was indirectly lending its credit to
homeowners—another big subsidy.
Third, certain financial innovations made more money available in
the housing market. Of these, the most important were securitizations and
24
This fact—that the bubble appeared in one particular market and not others—is quite enough,
incidentally, to disprove the moralizing account of the financial crisis. For example, if, as Professor
Colombo thinks, the financial crisis resulted from “a national crisis of character,” how come all the
excesses he decries affected only the housing market? Colombo, supra note 4, at 1. Are we to believe
that financial professionals who securitized home mortgages are profit-grubbing villains but financial
professionals who securitized, say, car loans or student loans, are fine, upstanding people? This may
require a logical miracle, for often they were the very same people.
25
I.R.C. §163(h) (Lexis 2009).
26
I.R.C. §164(a).
27
I.R.C. §121.
28
E.g., Donald B. Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514 (1943); Mark A.
Haskell & Joel Kauffman, Taxation of Imputed Income: The Bargain-Purchase Problem, 17 NAT’L
TAX’N J. 232 (1964); see also Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934) (holding
that taxpayers cannot be required to include in gross income the rental value of real property they own
and occupy).
29
Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes over
Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.
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subprime mortgages. Because those who advocate moralizing explanations
of the financial crisis have especially harsh criticisms of both these financial
innovations, I shall give more detailed explanations of both below. For
now, it is enough to understand that both securitizations and subprime
mortgages greatly expanded the mortgage market. Securitizations did this
on the supply side, because they allowed investors around the world to
invest in mortgage debt in a very convenient form, thus increasing the
amount of capital available to make mortgage loans and so driving down
interest rates even further.30 Subprime mortgages did this on the demand
side because they allowed people who previously could not obtain
mortgages (because they could not meet traditional underwriting criteria) to
borrow money to buy houses.31 The combination of these innovations
channeled hundreds of billions of dollars into the housing market.
So the story thus far has two parts. First, the Federal Reserve, by
mistakenly setting interest rates too low for too long, gave people rational
incentives to borrow a tremendous amount of money. Second, because of
various structural factors, a great deal of that money poured into the housing
market, resulting in a steep rise in the prices of residential real estate. This
was the housing bubble.
But, as with any other bubble, it was impossible to know we were in
a bubble while the bubble lasted. One view of the world (the true one, as it
turns out, even though it seemed unlikely at the time) was that housing
prices had bubbled.32 Another view (the false one, even though it was
backed up by plausible reasons that convinced almost everyone, including
me, at the time) was that changes in economic fundamentals justified higher
housing prices. Under conditions as they then existed, most knowledgeable
people thought that Alan Greenspan, the long-time Chairman of the Federal
Reserve who had presided over the Great Moderation and had steered the
American economy so successfully for so long, had discovered the secret to
economic nirvana: sustained low interest rates without inflation.33 This was
a plausible claim because for a long time the numbers seemed to bear it out.
Indeed, when Greenspan retired in 2006, no less an authority than Milton
Friedman wrote in the Wall Street Journal that Greenspan’s “performance
has indeed been remarkable” and was “more than a difference of degree; it
30
See generally MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360º LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 79-93 (Pearson Education, Inc. 2009)
(2008) (describing how securitization of home mortgage loans allowed investors around the world to
invest indirectly in the U.S. housing market).
31
ZANDI, supra note 30, at 9-10; Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic 28 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin.,
Working Paper No. 08-25, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1276047.
32
Prominent economists and others, most notably Nouriel Roubini of New York University, argued
that the housing market was suffering a tremendous bubble. See Stephen Mihm, Dr. Doom, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2008, (Magazine), at MM26.
33
E.g., David Malpass, The Fed Provided the Fuel, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at A13.
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approache[d] a difference of kind.”34 Note that Friedman said this long after
the Federal Reserve had flooded the world with credit that inflated the
housing bubble. As to the run-up in prices in the housing market, most
knowledgeable people thought this too was due to changes in fundamentals.
Thus, Ben Bernanke, now the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and then the
Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, told Congress
in 2005 that, although house prices had risen nearly 25% in the past two
years, “at a national level these price increases largely reflect strong
economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low
mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit
the expansion of housing supply in some areas.”35 We thus had two
competing accounts of what was happening. Although a small number of
people argued we were in bubble, most people accepted the fundamentalchange account, and for a long time the evidence seemed to favor the latter.
Eventually, of course, the truth became clear—and that was when housing
prices crashed.
IV. MORALS IN A MARKET BUBBLE—BORROWERS IN GENERAL
So what about all that supposedly immoral activity during the
bubble? The moralizers blame consumers who incurred too much debt, loan
originators who lent money to people who could not repay, loan securitizers
who sold mortgage-backed securities without disclosing the risks involved,
and bankers who took on excessive amounts of leverage.36 Once we see that
the defining condition of the bubble was abnormally low interest rates,
however, it is clear that none of these charges stands up.
Now, in any market there is a certain amount of fraud and other
wrongdoing, and that is as true of the housing and financial markets during
the bubble as of any others. Thus, I am not saying that everyone
participating in any way in these markets during the bubble was acting
uprightly; that is obviously not true. Hence, individual examples of proven
moral or even legal wrongdoing do not falsify my argument. Rather, what I
am saying is that the activities that the moralizers condemn were virtually
34

Milton Friedman, ‘He Has Set a Standard’, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2006, at A14.
The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 109th Cong. 54 (2005),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docif=
f:27013.pdf (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, J. Econ. Comm.).
36
Actually, the list in the text is incomplete; moralizers find a way to blame virtually everyone
participating in the housing and financial markets during the bubble. This is a sure sign, incidentally,
that the moralizers have misdiagnosed the problem. They are asking us to believe that all kinds of people
with nothing in common, except the fact that they were involved in some way or other with a particular
market (residential real estate in the United States), all simultaneously went on immoral binges and, by
sheer bad luck, their disparate forms of wrongdoing just happened all to result in higher asset prices and
so a bubble. As explained more fully in the text, the correct account is that there were important general
factors—abnormally low interest rates coupled with reasonable error about possibly changed
fundamentals—that affected various people all in the same way—i.e., a way that tended to cause them to
overvalue houses and assets backed by them.
35
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always the lawful, rational, moral actions of average people responding to
the financial incentives that had been created for them. This market
bubble—like every other market bubble in history—was produced by
rational commercial activity undertaken in conditions of uncertainty. The
bubble and the crash can be fully explained without positing any moral
wrongdoing by anyone—just policy mistakes about interest rates by the
Federal Reserve and normal commercial activity responding to the
incentives those mistakes created—all in a context of unavoidable
uncertainty and error about whether certain economic fundamentals had
changed.
Let us start with consumers. Was it immoral for consumers to
borrow so much money during the bubble, whether to buy houses or
anything else? Well, if interest rates are abnormally low, of course people
are going to borrow more money. The whole purpose of the Federal
Reserve’s decision to keep rates so low for so long was to encourage
borrowing in order to increase economic activity. Interest is the cost of
borrowing money, and so it is not stupid—in fact, it is smart—to borrow
more when credit is cheap. I recently refinanced my house and received a
4.25% interest rate on a thirty-year mortgage; I pay a lower rate on my
mortgage than the historical average rate on thirty-year treasury bonds. I
think that was pretty clever of me. Was it greedy? Greed is the inordinate
desire for money and the things money can buy,37 and I don’t see anything
inordinate about paying less for my mortgage than I have to. Borrowing
money when interest rates are low is no different from buying other things
when they’re on sale. If it is not greedy to buy the two-for-one special at the
supermarket, it is not greedy to borrow more money when interest rates are
at historic lows.
But what about the consumers who borrowed money they were
unable to repay? Was that stupid, greedy, or both? First of all, in many
cases, when people borrowed that money, they thought—reasonably, though
it turned out mistakenly—they would be able to repay. If interest rates
really were going to stay very low indefinitely, and if the fundamentals of
the housing market really had changed such that the house prices that we
saw in the bubble were justified, then most people could have repaid the
money they borrowed. These people made mistakes about future market
conditions, but they were reasonable mistakes—the same mistakes, writ
small, that Alan Greenspan (about interest rates) and Ben Bernanke (about
housing prices) were making writ large. It is ridiculous to blame the
average American—let alone blame him or her morally—for failing to
predict the future behavior of markets better than Greenspan and Bernanke
37
This is the definition of Thomas Aquinas, whom I take to be an authority on morality. See
THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL 391-94 (Jean T. Oesterle & John A. Oesterle trans., 1995).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss1/7

2009]

MORALS IN A MARKET BUBBLE

123

did. You may as well say that the passengers on the Titanic were morally at
fault for not discovering the flaws in the ship’s design and not foreseeing the
iceberg. Normal people without expertise trust acknowledged experts, and
if it turns out that the experts were wrong (and especially if such experts
were reasonably wrong), this is not the fault of the people who trusted them.
V. SUBPRIME MORTGAGES AND SECURITIZATIONS
Still, what about those subprime mortgages—mortgages made to
borrowers with poor credit histories and little or no verifiable income—
especially when they involved no money down and low teaser rates that
reset to much higher rates after a couple of years?38 Aren’t these clear cases
of “irresponsible lending practices” driven by “aggressive greed for market
share and short-term results”?39 Were not the loan originators tricking
people into taking out mortgages that they did not understand and had no
hope of repaying, and then securitizing the loans and passing off the risk to
unsuspecting investors? That certainly sounds immoral, doesn’t it?
I suppose it does, but that was not what happened. Both subprime
mortgages and securitizations of mortgages are complex financial products,
and this is very much a case where the details matter. Ignore those details,
and you are likely to fall for simplistic, moralizing explanations; look more
carefully, and it turns out the picture is quite different.
A. Subprime Mortgages
Thirty years ago, when a person applied for a mortgage, he usually
did so in person to a loan officer at a bank, often a local bank. The loan
officer had or obtained a good deal of information specific to the potential
borrower before deciding whether or not to approve the loan. The decision
making was individualized. Nowadays, however, when people apply for
mortgages, they often do so online or otherwise by filling out standardized
forms, and the loan originators feed the information on these forms into
computerized algorithms to determine whether and how much to lend to the
borrower. There is very little individualized investigation of borrowers and
so little individualized decision making. On balance, this is a good thing
because it lowers transaction costs for lenders and facilitates comparative
shopping by borrowers, both of which translate into lower interest rates for
worthy borrowers, which makes owning homes cheaper and expands the
class of persons able to afford homes.
One byproduct of this system, however, is that it creates a class of
people who cannot get mortgages anywhere—the people who fail to meet
the standardized criteria. Under the older system, many of these people
38
39
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could get mortgages because they were applying to loan officers who either
already knew them or otherwise would get to know them and either way
became satisfied that they were good risks. After the standardization of the
loan application process, however, that no longer happened. This created an
underserved market for home loans—people who really could pay back the
money if given a chance but who did not meet standardized underwriting
criteria. Naturally enough, these people still wanted to borrow, and lenders
wanted to lend to them. But, of all those people who did not meet the
standardized underwriting criteria, figuring out which were the potential
borrowers who could repay and which were those who could not seemed
impossible. The transaction costs of individualized investigation and
decision making were too high. Moreover, the lenders could not solve the
problem by lending to all these people willy-nilly and just setting the
interest rates high enough to cover their losses on the borrowers who would
default, for an interest high enough to cover the inevitable losses would have
priced out of the market even the good borrowers in the pool.
This created a genuine conundrum. How could lenders identify
cost-effectively the good borrowers among all those who did not meet the
standardized underwriting criteria? That was the problem the subprime
mortgage was designed to solve. Such mortgages combine three key
features: (a) low initial interest rates, often so low that the lender would lose
money at such rates; (b) a reset of the rate after two or three years to a much
higher rate, often a rate so high that the borrower could not make the
payments at such rate; and (c) a very steep pre-payment penalty.
Now, how did such mortgages solve the problem of sorting out
good borrowers from bad ones? Well, first, the pre-payment penalty makes
sure that the borrower does not refinance the loan with another lender before
the reset date; until the reset date, the borrower is locked into a relationship
with the lender. During those two or three years, the interest rate is very
low, and the borrower is, as it were, on probation. The lender is able to
amass—relatively cheaply—much more information about the borrower,
such as whether he makes the payments on the mortgage on time. When the
reset date arrives and the borrower finds that he cannot make the payments
at the higher rate, he has little choice but to return to his lender and ask to
refinance the loan.
At this point, the lender has an option, as well as considerably more
information about the borrower than he had when he first wrote the
subprime mortgage. Perhaps the borrower has made all his payments on
time, his credit score has improved, and his income has increased (the
income of most people does increase during their working years) or has
become more verifiable. In that case, the borrower may now meet the
standardized underwriting criteria, and the lender will be able to refinance
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the subprime loan with a conventional thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage. On
the other hand, perhaps the borrower has missed many of the payments on
the loan, his credit score has deteriorated, and his income has decreased or
become even less verifiable. In that case, the lender will foreclose on the
loan, sell the house, and—at least if the value of the house has not crashed—
recover enough money to cover his costs. Finally, if at the reset date it is
not clear whether a borrower falls into either of these classes (maybe the
borrower has made almost but not quite all the payments on time and has
neither raised nor lowered his income or credit score), then the lender can
repeat the process. That is, the lender will refinance the subprime mortgage
with another subprime mortgage and revisit the question in another two or
three years. In fact, a large percentage of the subprime mortgages written at
the height of the bubble in 2006 were the second or even third refinancing of
subprime mortgages written years earlier.
Thus, subprime mortgages were really sorting devices. They were a
low-cost way of identifying, among the vast number of potential borrowers
who did not meet standardized underwriting criteria, those that could, and
those that could not, repay the money they wanted to borrow. Moreover, in
the years leading up to 2006, subprime mortgages worked well. There was,
however, an important assumption in the design of subprime mortgages:
when the lender had to foreclose on a subprime loan, the property would be
worth enough to cover the lender’s costs—that is, the unpaid balance of the
loan plus other expenses. In a world where housing prices were rising or at
least basically steady, that was not a problem.40 But if housing prices
crashed, then, when the interest rate on the subprime mortgage reset, the
borrower would probably not want to refinance the loan even if he had the
financial capacity to do so. After all, who wants to pay a mortgage for more
than the house is worth? The borrower would usually want to walk away,
and often this was quite easy for the borrower to do. Sometimes, it was not
worth the lender’s time and effort to pursue a deficiency judgment against
the borrower (many subprime borrowers had few other assets the lender
could take), and in some state laws (notably California41 and Arizona,42
which, not accidentally, have some of the highest foreclosure rates in the
United States),43 actually prohibit the lender from seeking a deficiency
judgment. Hence, in such cases the lender will foreclose on the house but
will suffer severe losses.

40
See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 23, at 2 (showing that, from 1988 to 2006, the S&P/CaseSchiller Home Price Index had almost always increased and had never declined more than that about 7%
in a given year).
41
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 2009).
42
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-729, 33-814G (2007).
43
Press Release, RealtyTrac, 1.9 Million Foreclosure Filings Reported on More than 1.5 Million
U.S. Properties in First Half of 2009 (July 16, 2009) (available at http://www.realtytrac.com/Content
Manager/PressRelease.aspx?ItemID=6802).
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So, when lenders wrote subprime mortgages, they were taking the
risk that housing prices would decrease. The lender was essentially going
long on the housing market in ways that traditional lenders who required
borrowers to make substantial down payments were not. In the midst of the
housing bubble, however, the risk that real estate prices would fall sharply
seemed remote. From 1988 to 2006, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price
Index had almost always increased from year to year, and it had never
declined as much as ten—let alone twenty—percent.44 The essence of the
bubble was that it seemed very likely that fundamentals had changed in a
way that justified much higher housing prices. Recall that Bernanke had
assured Congress that the run-up in housing prices was due to fundamental
changes. In saying this, he was agreeing with the conventional wisdom
among government officials, academic economists, and financial
professionals. For banks and others writing subprime loans in the midst of
the bubble, it was quite reasonable, therefore, to take the risk they did. It
was a mistake, but making mistakes—especially being deceived in a market
bubble when all the world is deceived with you—is not immoral. It is
merely human.
Thus, I do not understand how lenders who wrote subprime
mortgages were acting immorally. They understood very well what they
were doing, including that they were going long on the housing market.
That investment decision, like all investment decisions, involved a certain
risk, but the lenders taking this risk were being compensated accordingly in
the form of a higher return. All investments involve risk, and there is
nothing immoral in making more risky rather than less risky investments.
Nor were subprime lenders treating their borrowers unfairly. True,
many such borrowers did not understand the terms of the deal they made
(for instance, that the rates would reset so much higher after a couple of
years), and surely almost none of them understood how subprime mortgages
were used to sort borrowers unable to meet standardized underwriting
criteria. Indeed, even professional commentators of the moralizing sort
seem not to grasp this point. But that is hardly proof of moral wrongdoing
by the lenders. Even with relatively simple financial products such as
homeowners insurance, consumers often fail to understand important terms
of the contracts they sign. This is not because insurance companies are evil
or their customers are stupid. It is because insurance policies are long,
complex and difficult to read documents, and so obtaining information about
them is costly for consumers, and consumers often have better things to do
with their time. (Have you read your homeowners insurance policy? I have
not read mine and have no plans to do so). From an economic point of
view, consumers rely on market forces (i.e., competition among insurance
44

STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 23, at 2.
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companies) to guarantee that the terms of the policy are reasonably favor to
them. From a moral point of view, what matters is not whether consumers
actually understand the deals they make, but whether those deals are
objectively fair and reasonable.
And subprime mortgages were objectively fair and reasonable to the
borrowers. If a borrower told the truth on the loan application, made
payments on time, and generally lived up to his end of the bargain, then—
except for the bursting of the housing bubble—the lender would have
refinanced the mortgage, perhaps many times over, and the borrower would
have eventually been able to get a conventional mortgage on terms he could
afford. If the borrower did not make the payments or suffered other
financial reverses, the lender would foreclose. But that, generally speaking,
is the deal everyone buying a home with a mortgage loan thinks he is
getting: if you don’t make the payments, you don’t get to keep the house.
That is a perfectly fair and reasonable deal.
Subprime mortgages are going into default—and subprime
borrowers are losing their homes—not because of any unfairness in the deal,
but because subprime mortgages were predicated on the assumption that
housing prices would stay basically steady or at least not decline sharply.
Granted, most subprime borrowers did not understand this, but it is hard to
see how this creates any unfairness. After all, whenever anyone buys a
house, he assumes it is not going to lose value, that it is going to be worth at
least as much in the future as it is the day he buys it. For, if the buyer
thought it likely that the value of the house would decline, why buy it now?
Why not wait till next year when the price is less? Thus, subprime
borrowers were in fact themselves already making the key assumption on
which subprime mortgages were based: that the houses they were buying
would not lose a significant portion of their value. Had the importance of
the assumption been called to their attention before they agreed to the
mortgage, it is difficult to imagine that many subprime borrowers would
have decided not to proceed. The risk was one that they knew, at least on
some level, that they were taking.
Indeed, it seems to me that, so far from treating borrowers unfairly,
subprime deals worked out much worse for lenders than for borrowers. For
example, consider the following scenario. In early 2006, a borrower making
$30,000 per year took out a no-money-down, subprime mortgage to buy a
$200,000 house; the initial interest rate was 4%, but the rate would reset to
12% in two years. The borrower makes all the payments, paying $8,000 per
year to the lender for two years, which amounts to about $666 per month.
By 2008, the housing bubble has burst, and the house is worth only
$150,000. When the rate on the mortgage resets, the borrower’s monthly
payment goes from $666 per month to $2,000 per month—a payment the
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borrower, whose income has increased to $33,000 per year, cannot possibly
afford. At that point, the buyer walks away from the mortgage, and the
lender forecloses. The house is located in California or Arizona, and so the
lender is legally prohibited from seeking a deficiency judgment.45 This will
be a psychological blow to the borrower, to be sure, and his credit rating
will be impaired.46 Still, the cause of the blow is not the unfairness of the
terms of a subprime mortgage; it is that we were in a bubble, and the bubble
burst. On any objective appraisal, however, the lender suffered more harm
than the borrower. After foreclosure, the lender is out $50,000 (the
difference between the unpaid principal on the loan, $200,000, and the value
of the house, $150,000), plus costs, plus the difference between the market
interest rate and the abnormally low 4% the lender received for two years.
The borrower, on the other hand, lived in the house for two years and in
effect paid rent of $666 a month—which is less than the median monthly
housing cost for renter-occupied units in the United States47 and less than
the 28% of his income that traditional underwriting guidelines usually
assume that borrowers can spend on housing.48 It may not feel like it to the
borrower, but he in fact got a pretty good deal: the lender subsidized his
housing expenses for two years and gave him an option to buy the house if it
held its value—which, it turns out, it did not. The lender lost money on the
teaser rate, lost principal when it foreclosed, and lost all its other expenses.
If anyone received a raw deal here, it was the lender, not the borrower. I do
not mean that the lender got treated unfairly, of course: he too knowingly
took a risk and lost; it is just that his losses are probably much worse than
the borrower’s.
B. Securitizations of Mortgages
But didn’t lenders securitize all those mortgages and in doing so
pass them off to unsuspecting investors, so that when the crash came, it was
the investors, not the loan originators, who took the losses? In doing so,
didn’t the loan originators or investment banks securitizing the loans lie to
the investors or, at the very least, “pass[] risk [on] to investors without
disclosure”?49 No, not really. That too is a myth.
The easiest way to see that subprime loan originators were not
45
See generally James R. Hagerty & Nick Timiraos, Debtor’s Dilemma: Pay the Mortgage or Walk
Away?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009 at A22.
46
Cristine Gonzalez, Strategic Default: The Real Cost of Walking Away from Your Mortgage,
CREDIT.COM, Jan. 8, 2010, http://www.credit.com/news/economic-crisis/2010-01-07/strategic-defaultthe-real-cost-of-walking-away-from-your-mortgage.html.
47
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, GCT2514: MEDIAN MONTHLY
HOUSING COSTS FOR RENTER OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS (DOLLARS) (2008), http://factfinder.census.
gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-_box_head_nbr=GCT2514&-ds_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&_lang=en&-format=US-9T (listing data set for 2006-2008).
48
Tara Siegel Bernard, With Eyes Bigger Than Their Wallets, Homebuyers Are Forced to Revisit
Old Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at B6.
49
Hoak, supra note 1.
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passing off all the risk of subprime loans to investors is to notice that, when
the subprime market crashed, the loan originators suffered huge losses along
with the buyers of mortgage-backed securities the originators had sold.50 In
fact, dozens of the loan originators went bankrupt, including Option One,
Ameriquest, and New Century;51 Countrywide Financial probably would
have gone bankrupt too had not Bank of America acquired it. Banks that
underwrote securitizations of mortgage-backed securities such as Citibank,
UBS, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Stearns all suffered huge losses, while
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.52 Why? Because these institutions were
holding a great deal of risk on the loans they had securitized. Hence, when
housing prices crashed and the value of the securities ultimately backed by
the houses crashed along with them, the securitizing institutions took huge
losses. It is clear, therefore, that these institutions were retaining much risk
with respect to the loans they were securitizing; the idea that they were
passing the risk on to others is simply inconsistent with the most basic facts
of where losses fell in the subprime crash.
So how did the securitizing parties retain risk? Well, for one thing,
before the securitizing party can securitize a pool of loans, it must amass
them. This takes time, and so the securitizing party must carry the loans on
its own books for a considerable period, often several months—warehousing
them before it can sell them. If the loans go into default during this period,
the risk is entirely on the securitizers. In fact, a good deal of the losses
suffered by Citibank, Bear Stearns, and others arose in exactly this way. A
loan originator thus has a strong structural incentive not to write loans likely
to go into default quickly.
Even apart from that, however, the moral hazard problem the
moralizers think they discovered—one party makes the credit decision,
another bears the risk of repayment—has in fact been well understood by
market participants for a very long time, and securitization transactions are
carefully structured to make sure that the securitizer’s incentives are aligned
with those of the investors. First and perhaps most important, the
securitizing party often retains the bottom (that is, last-to-be-paid) tranche of
the securities; hence, the first dollar of loss on the loans would be for the
account of the securitizer. If a loan originator were writing large numbers of
bad loans, it would be setting itself up to take huge losses on these retained
tranches. Second, especially for loan originators like Countrywide, the
originator often retains the loan-servicing rights on securitized loans. These
rights are valuable because they generate income for the originator for the
50

Gorton, supra note 31, at 28.
See Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Nov.
11, 2009).
52
Gorton, supra note 31, at 28.
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life of the loan. If the loans go into default, these fees disappear. Because
such fees were a major source of many loan originators’ income, it would
make little financial sense for loan originators to securitize loans that were
likely to tank. They would never receive from such loans a major portion of
the income necessary to make the deal on balance profitable for them.
Finally, many securitization deals contain provisions that require the
securitizer to repurchase bad loans—for example, loans that go into default
within six months of being securitized. Combined, such provisions largely
neutralize the moral hazard problem and result in the securitizer retaining
substantial risk with respect to the securitized loans.
Most fundamentally, the whole theory of the moralizers—that
securitization passes all the risk off to investors—ignores basic aspects of
financial reality. Risk and return are related. If investors take more risk on
securitized mortgages, they demand a higher return, which is to say they
would pay less for the mortgage-backed securities. If a loan originator
weakens its underwriting standards, it may make more loans, but it does not
necessarily make larger profits because the price for which it can sell such
loans declines to reflect the added risk the buyer is taking.
The obvious way for a loan originator to make more money by
lowering its underwriting standards is to do this and then conceal the fact
from investors—in other words, to commit securities fraud. Even this
probably would not work in the long run, for the fraud would eventually be
discovered and, at the very least, the fraudster would lose access to the
funding sources necessary for its business model—but let us put this
consideration aside. Did loan originators lower their underwriting standards
and then fail to disclose this fact to the investors who bought their mortgagebacked securities? There is little evidence for this claim. There have been
relatively few securities fraud cases against the major securitizers,53 and in
those that have been brought, the defendants have won.
For example, in Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v.
Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp.,54 institutional investors who had
purchased mortgage-backed securities sued the securitizing entity alleging
various violations of the federal securities laws, all based on alleged
misstatements or omissions from the prospectuses and the registrations
53

The SEC has brought a civil enforcement action against Angelo Mozilo and two other former
senior executives of Countrywide Financial, alleging that they committed securities fraud and violated
the federal securities laws in various other ways—but the complaint does not include an allegation
related to mortgage-backed securities that Countrywide sold in securitizations. Rather, the allegation is
that Mozilo and others committed fraud with respect to Countrywide’s common stock by misleading
shareholders about how much risk Countrywide was retaining with respect to subprime loans. If true, the
allegations in the complaint undermine rather than support the idea that Countrywide passed off risk to
investors who purchased its mortgage-backed securities. See Complaint at 47-48, 50, SEC v. Mozilo,
No. CV09-03994 VBF AJWx (C.D. Cal. filed June 4, 2009).
54
No. 08-10446-RGS, 2009 WL 3149775, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2009).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss1/7

2009]

MORALS IN A MARKET BUBBLE

131

statements containing them related to the securities. In particular, the
plaintiffs alleged that “the registration statements falsely stated that the
originators’ underwriting standards were intended to insure that prospective
borrowers were creditworthy[,]” when in fact, the plaintiffs said, the
underwriting standards of the originating banks “were never intended to
filter out potentially risky borrowers” because “the banks were hellbent on
originating as many loans as possible with an eye to short-term profit
without any regard to the ability of the borrowers to repay.”55 This, of
course, is exactly the allegation made by the moralizing commentators who
seek to explain the housing bubble on the basis of alleged moral
wrongdoing. The court, however, had no trouble finding the claim meritless.
Noting that the registration statements contained “numerous warnings
flagging the permissive underwriting practices underlying the mortgage
pools” backing the securities,56 the court went on to state that the offering
documents contained a “fusillade of cautionary statements” and revealed
that “the vast majority of the loans . . . had been originated under limited
documentation programs and that the borrower’s income as a result had not
been verified.”57 The plaintiffs’ argument that they were not on notice as to
the originator’s actual underwriting practices, the court concluded, “begs
credulity.”58 Indeed, the court concluded that the offering documents
described the relevant risks over and over again, with “deathless
repetition”59—a characterization anyone who has read such securities filings
knows to be accurate.
The reason for the outcome in Nomura and cases like it is obvious.
It’s not that investors thought they were getting low-risk assets and in fact
were sold high-risk assets; it’s that they bought, and knew they were buying,
assets with a certain risk level, which included a very remote risk of
substantial losses in the very unlikely event that housing prices across the
United States suffered steep declines.60 That remote risk came to pass, and
the securities lost value.
How did the risk come to pass? It came to pass because the
United States housing market was suffering a massive bubble. When the
bubble burst, housing prices crashed and interests in houses, including
mortgages and securities backed by mortgages, turned out to be worth much
less than everyone had thought. One of the risks of investing in mortgagebacked securities—a risk that was obvious to everyone involved and that
55

Id. at *4-*5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
58
Id.
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Id. at *5 n.6.
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Recall again that, for twenty years prior to the bursting of the bubble, the S&P Case-Shiller
Home Price Index was almost always up year-over-year and never once lost more 7% of its value—much
less the 20% or so it lost in the bursting of the bubble. STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 23, at 2.
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was routinely disclosed in the offering documents for mortgage-backed
securities—was that if housing prices crashed, many more mortgages than
usual would go into default, and thus the securities would lose value.
Investors in mortgage-backed securities—generally banks, insurance
companies, hedge funds and other sophisticated parties—understood this
perfectly and discounted mortgage-backed securities accordingly.
For example, imagine that in 2005, an investment bank sold a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO), and suppose that, if housing prices did
not decline more than 20%, then the CDO would be worth $1.005 billion. If
housing prices did decline that much, however, the CDO would be worth
only $500 million. In the midst of the bubble, a commercial bank buying
that CDO may have thought that there was a 1% chance that housing prices
would decline 20%. So it would price the CDO at $1 billion (that is, 0.99
multiplied by $1.005 billion, plus 0.01 multiplied by $500 million). In fact,
that remote risk came to pass when the housing bubble burst; hence, the
bank’s CDO turned out to be worth only $500 million, and the bank lost
$500 million on the transaction.
But that was the deal the bank signed up for. It was not that the
securitizers lied or deceived the investors or even failed to disclose potential
risks; it was, rather, that a risk everyone was aware of but thought was very
remote actually came to pass. This is always what happens in a bubble: for
a long time, people are systematically mistaken in thinking that a change in
fundamentals justifies much higher prices for a class of assets, and when the
mistake is discovered, the prices of those assets fall. Whoever happens to
hold interests in those assets at the time bears the loss—in this case, both
loan originators and holders of mortgage-backed securities. The whole
thing is perfectly explicable without any moral wrongdoing by anyone.
Furthermore, securitizations and similar transactions have been
around for decades and have been used successfully in any number of
markets, not just with residential mortgages. Commercial loans, credit card
receivables, automobile loans, student loans, lease payments for both real
estate and equipment, loans financing private equity deals—all of these are
either securitized or else parceled out in ways economically similar to
securitizations. Reinsurance works analogously too. In none of these
markets did the alleged moral-hazard problem create a bubble and a crash.
Nor did a problem arise for decades in the market for mortgage-backed
securities. This is powerful evidence that securitization was not the
problem. The problem was something peculiar to the housing market during
the years 2002 through 2007, and we already know what was peculiar about
that market—very low interest rates were feeding the largest asset bubble in
American history. Bear that in mind, and it is obvious there were going to
be huge losses for everyone involved when the bubble burst.
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Finally, this is not to say that the securitization of mortgages played
no role at all in the housing bubble. By allowing investors around the world
to invest indirectly in the United States housing market, the securitization of
home mortgage loans vastly expanded the amount of capital flowing into
that market, and this contributed to generating the bubble. But this effect of
securitization involves no moral wrongdoing by anyone—just an unforeseen
negative consequence of a perfectly legitimate activity, and a consequence
that likely would never have resulted but for the mistakes of the Federal
Reserve in managing monetary policy. There was also an analogous effect
of securitization when the bubble burst: the losses from the crash were
spread very widely. This may well be a good thing, for if a loss of the same
size were concentrated among a smaller number of market participants, we
would surely have seen even more bankruptcies and bank failures than
actually resulted.
VI. BANKS LEVERAGING UP
What about all the banks and other financial institutions that
increased their leverage during the bubble, sometimes reaching debt-toequity ratios of thirty-to-one or more? By borrowing all that money, did
they not take risks that were, at the very least, imprudent? If they should
have known better, wasn’t what they were doing immoral? Weren’t they, in
Professor Colombo’s words, “putting profits before people”?61
Again, no, not really. All firms are more or less leveraged, and
leverage increases not only risk but returns—that is, profits. In increasing
their leverage during the bubble, the banks were indeed taking on more risk
(and knew they were doing so),62 but they did this with the rational
expectation of higher profits. But why did so many banks decide to do this
simultaneously? Why were they all leveraging up at the same time? By this
point, the reason for this should be obvious, for it is the same reason why
consumers borrowed so much money during the bubble: because, during the
bubble, credit was very cheap, and it was very cheap because the Federal
Reserve had kept interest rates so low for so long.63 Just as consumers had
61
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done, banks rationally borrowed more during the bubble because the cost of
borrowing had fallen. That is the natural and inevitable effect of low
interest rates.
But didn’t the banks’ leveraging up increase the risk of bankruptcy?
Of course it did, but all businesses take on a small but positive risk of
bankruptcy. There is no moral principle that determines the highest
permissible risk of bankruptcy; there is only the fact that the higher the risk,
the higher the expected return. Nor were bankers taking extraordinary risks
during the bubble; they were taking perfectly rational risks that—because
they were in fact in a bubble—came to pass contrary to people’s reasonable
expectations and had disastrous effects. As Judge Posner puts it:
In gauging the risk of calamity, the key probabilities [the
banks] had to consider were that the rise in housing prices
was a bubble and that if it burst house prices would fall by
at least 20 percent. If both events came to pass, insolvency
would loom. Suppose the best guess was that there was a 10
percent probability that the price rise was a bubble and the
same probability that if it was a bubble house prices would
fall by at least 20 percent. Then the probability that house
prices would fall by at least 20 percent was only 1 percent
(0.1 × 0.1), and so the risk of disaster would have seemed
worth running.64
I do not see anything immoral in that, just as I see nothing immoral
in running other very small risks of disaster—like the risk that, if you ride
the space shuttle, you might be killed in an accident (as in Posner’s example,
NASA engineers estimate that the risk of a catastrophic failure of a shuttle
mission is about 1%).65 If you choose to ride the space shuttle and you are
killed in an accident, it would be ludicrous to say you were immoral for
taking the risk. Some risks are worth taking, and they remain worth taking
even when they come to pass and the venture works out very badly.
Of course, it was not just one bank, or a small number of them, that
leveraged up during the bubble; it was virtually all of them. This fact alone,
incidentally, is strong evidence that it was not an epidemic of irrational
greed but a rational response to market conditions as reasonably perceived
that led to the increase in leverage. However, because all the banks
leveraged up simultaneously, the risks of bankruptcy they were each taking
became correlated. That is, the events that would cause one of them to fail
would also likely cause them all the fail. Now, a large number of
64
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simultaneous bank failures is extremely dangerous for the economy because
it steeply reduces the supply of credit, puts many people’s savings at risk,
and has a huge negative effect on confidence. These costs fall not only on
the banks and their shareholders but on everyone involved in the economy.
Hence, when the banks leveraged up at the same time, they externalized a
significant part of the risk. Wasn’t that immoral?
By now you can guess the answer: no, it was not. Consider your
own behavior during the current recession. Like most consumers, because
you are worried about your financial future (for example, that you may lose
your job), you have probably cut back on your spending and increased your
savings. That is a perfectly rational thing for you to do. Even more, the
moralizing critics, who think it was morally wrong for people to borrow and
spend so much money during the bubble, doubtlessly think that it is morally
praiseworthy for you to be so thrifty now. One effect of your spending less
and saving more, however, is that you are making the recession worse. In a
recession, demand falls below the capacity for output, which means that
producers have to cut costs, most importantly by laying off workers. When
workers are laid off, they spend less than they did before, which lowers
demand even more and leads to more layoffs. A vicious cycle is started, and
it is not broken until demand stabilizes and starts rising again. What is best
for you individually, of course, is just what most consumers are currently
doing—saving more and spending less—but what’s best for the economy as
a whole would be just the opposite—saving less and spending more. In
being thrifty, you are externalizing part of the costs of your actions, because
part of those costs will fall on other participants in the economy. Are you
immoral because, in doing what is best for you and your family, you are
externalizing part of your costs by making the recession worse? Let the
moralizer who is without sin be the first to spend a dollar.
In the midst of the bubble, the banks were in a similar position.
What was best for each bank individually was to take advantage of the
Federal Reserve’s low interest rates by leveraging up, taking on more risk,
and—hopefully—making more money.
From a societal standpoint,
however, this was not a good thing because it created a correlated risk that
many banks could become insolvent simultaneously, and that would be a
disaster for everyone. In such cases, however, we cannot expect banks—or
anyone else for that matter—to abstain from acting in their rational selfinterest because of the infinitesimal effect their particular actions would
have on the common good of society. The effect of any individual or firm’s
actions is too small and too remote to expect them to take account of it.
Moreover, if, during the bubble, a bank had declined to follow the rational
strategy its competitors were following, that bank would have been
significantly less profitable, which would cause the value of its stock to fall,
which would raise the cost of its equity capital and make it even less
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profitable. Its shareholders would likely have complained loudly and
perhaps even replaced the directors with others willing to follow the herd.
Neither bank executives nor consumers can reasonably be expected to
neglect their own interests and those of their families to help the broader
economy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This quick tour through the financial crisis began at the Federal
Reserve, where Alan Greenspan and his colleagues on the Federal Open
Market Committee made some mistakes in the early years of this decade by
keeping interest rates very low for a very long time.66 That made available
in the markets huge amounts of credit, and that money had to go
somewhere. Once this mistake was made, the rest was practically
inevitable. Because of the natural tendency of real estate to attract debt, the
subsidies that the United States provides for individual home ownership, and
certain innovations in the financial markets such as subprime mortgages and
the widespread use of securitizations, much of the tsunami of money
entering the economy poured into the United States residential real estate
market. This allowed consumers to borrow money very cheaply in order to
buy houses, and that drove housing prices up sharply. While all this was
going on, however, there was genuine uncertainty as to the cause of the runup in housing prices. Most people thought—mistakenly, albeit with good
reason—that the Federal Reserve had discovered how to keep interest rates
low without triggering inflation and that the rise in housing prices was due
to fundamental changes in the housing market such as robust growth in
family income, steady rates of household formation, and various limits on
the supply of housing. Most of the smartest and best informed people in the
world accepted this theory at the time. But, we now know, they were
wrong. The supposed changes in fundamentals—both as to interest rates
and as to housing—were illusions. We were in a gigantic bubble. When the
bubble burst, housing prices crashed, as did the value of indirect investments
in housing such as mortgage-backed securities. The losses, and then the
ripple effects from them, were tremendous—enough to destroy Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers and, had the government not acted swiftly to
recapitalize them, who knows how many other major banks.
That is the story of the great financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The
whole thing is explicable without positing any villainy by anyone. Even if
Alan Greenspan and other members of the Federal Open Market Committee
were solely responsible for the whole thing, they were not morally at fault;
they just made some honest policy mistakes that, at the time, virtually
everyone thought were right. Why then are so many people, including
66
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people who really ought to know better, so anxious to assign moral blame?
There, I think, we touch on a strange truth about human nature. It is
deeply unnerving for us to think that, even when everyone is behaving
rationally and honestly, the result can be catastrophe. It reminds one of the
horror of Greek tragedy. Recall Oedipus, who, warned that he would kill
his father and marry his mother, did all he could to avoid that fate, but
nonetheless ended up killing his father and marrying his mother. Such
events highlight the limits of the human condition; they remind us how
limited our cognitive and other powers really are. Hence, when something
terrible happens, it is much more emotionally satisfying for us to identify a
villain and hang him from a light post in the town square. That way, justice
is done, and order is restored to the universe. We achieve catharsis. By
contrast, it takes a philosophical temperament to survey the limits of the
human condition and nod at them ironically.
Although the search for villains behind the financial crisis is human
and understandable, a felt need does not make a real fact. Moralizing critics
blame virtually everyone involved in the housing market, but in reality
virtually all of these people were entirely innocent. They were trapped in a
market bubble, and certainly none of these people, whether individually or
even collectively, engaged in any moral wrongdoing that caused the bubble
and the burst. As for the moralizing critics, they could do with some selfexamination. Blaming innocent people for things that are not their fault is
immoral.

Published by eCommons, 2009

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss1/7

